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Abstract
This thesis investigates whether the household income recovery after a negative income
shock, caused by a health or death shock, di↵ers between urban and rural areas in
Colombia. The hypothesis is that urban areas are financially worse o↵ compared to rural
areas after a shock due to di↵erences in availability of formal and informal insurances.
Uninsured households in urban areas are not covered by either a formal or informal
insurance which thus makes them worse o↵ compared to their rural counterpart. By
using linear OLS regressions and the di↵erence-in-di↵erence-in-di↵erences identification
strategy this thesis was able to confirm the research question that there is a statistically
significant di↵erence in income recovery between urban and rural households, between
those a↵ected and not a↵ected by the shock, before and after the shock occurred. The
results also seem to confirm the hypothesis due to the insu cient performance of formal
insurances in urban areas. This because the findings suggest that formal insurances are
unable to compensate the loss of the informal insurance system as they cannot counteract
the negative impact of the income shock. The results also show that regardless of area,
poor households are more likely to experience a shock compared to wealthy households.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A working insurance system provides several benefits to a society as, for instance, more
people can access better medical care when they have a health insurance to cover most
of the costs. Insurance also brings security, as for instance in a development country, a
farmer could receive some monetary compensation if his/her land is struck by disasters,
such as drought or heavy rainfalls. These insurance systems can be provided in two sep-
arate ways, namely by formal contracts between an o cial institution and an individual,
or by informal arrangements between individuals.
Formal insurance systems are defined as explicit attempts to create an insurance
market where individuals trade in risk (Besley, 1995). Gains from such trade are made
when individuals with di↵erent risk preferences trade with each other. Formal insurances
are therefore provided by the government or private insurance firms, and insurance
access is granted through o cial contracts. However, in almost all developing countries
these services are provided by the government, either by directly funded national health
services or by enforcing employers to finance the insurance (Pauly et al., 2006). These
contracts are set up between the insurer and the insured and promises that a pre-specified
monetary amount will be payed if an uncertain event is realized. The prospect of such
contracts is thus limited by the ability to specify and enforce them.
Informal insurance arrangements exist due to an imperfect formal insurance market.
They denote trade in risk between individuals in a community without the involvement
of o cial agencies. The existence of these systems can be argued from two conflict-
ing perspectives rooted in di↵erent beliefs of human behavior and interaction (Besley,
1995). First, that the trade is facilitated by altruistic feelings between members of a
neighborhood or social class. Second, that the trade is motivated by self-interested indi-
viduals who expect reciprocal behavior sometime in the future. These two perspectives
are linked with the possibility to socially enforce an informal insurance arrangement as
an individual’s risk behavior is thus modified by either norms of honesty or norms of
reciprocity.
When comparing the level of formal and informal insurance between the urban and
rural areas, it is likely that informal insurance arrangements do not exist in the same
extent in urban areas as in rural areas. This would be because in urban areas there
are less close-knit communities and higher anonymity than in rural areas which do not
promote the creation of informal structures to the same extent as in rural areas. In turn
the access to formal insurance in rural areas is likely to be much lower than in urban
areas as contracts are less enforceable as distance increases.
The degree to which formal and informal insurances can be measured di↵ers sig-
nificantly. Informal insurances are di cult to capture due to the structure of social
1
networks, while formal insurances are more traceable and reliable due to the realization
of contracts. Since formal insurances can be measured in actual numbers, descriptive
information about them can be collected through surveys and used for analysis. Based
on the presumed distribution of formal and informal insurances in urban and rural ar-
eas, information regarding formal insurances will in this thesis be used to discuss the
possible e↵ects of informal insurances. Therefore, this thesis will study the e↵ects on
income caused by an exogenous shock, and discuss how formal and informal insurances
contribute to income recovery in urban and rural areas.
There are various types of formal insurances an individual can buy, for example crop
insurance, health insurance or life insurance, which all provide the insured with some
pre-specified monetary amount if a specific event comes to pass. The formal insurances
that are considered in this thesis are health insurance and life insurance. It can be argued
that a well-functioning health insurance improves access to high quality health care and
accordingly lowers health risks (Besley, 1995). Hence, health insurance improves an indi-
vidual’s quality of life as it protects a households’ income and consumption possibilities.
Life insurance on the other hand, can improve the quality of life for the other members
of a household as it provides the household with a considerable monetary amount in the
case of a household member’s death.
Since health and life insurances will be of central interest in this thesis, the corre-
sponding two types of shocks, namely health shocks and death shocks, will be considered.
A health shock is when a member of a household suddenly and unexpectedly becomes
physically ill, while a death shock is when a member of a household suddenly and unex-
pectedly dies. Health shocks are therefore disruptive to a household’s income as labor
supply decreases and health expenditures increase, which can force consumption to fall
(Mohanan, 2013) and accordingly cause a negative income shock. Intuitively, death
shocks have a more permanent damage to household income compared to health shocks,
as the death of a household member results in a permanent loss of income. Baeza and
Packard (2006) list health shocks as an essential field of study since they are persistent
factors to why low-income households become poor. Lost income is therefore an impor-
tant aspect of this thesis, since it will focus on investigating the di↵erence in income
levels after a health or death shock, and more importantly the income recovery e↵ect for
households with a health or life insurance.
1.1 Purpose and research question
The research question of this thesis is: does the income of urban and rural households
recover di↵erently from an income shock caused by an exogenous health or death shock?.
The purpose of this thesis is hence to explore if there is a statistically significant di↵erence
in income recovery between urban and rural areas after they are exposed to an exogenous
health or death shock. Our theoretical prediction is that this relationship varies between
the areas as a result of di↵erent access to and level of formal health and life insurance.
The hypothesis is thus that the income recovery gap after a health or death shock,
between those formally insured and uninsured in urban areas is larger than the corre-
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sponding gap in rural areas. This would mean that the formally uninsured in urban areas
have a more negative income e↵ect than those formally uninsured in rural areas. The
idea is that those in rural areas that do not have a formal insurance are instead covered
by an informal insurance arrangement. However, those without a formal insurance in
urban areas would not have this advantage and would therefore be completely without
any form of health or life insurance.
1.2 Scope
The main focus of this thesis is the di↵erence in income recovery caused by a health
or death shock in urban and rural areas. Additionally, the thesis briefly discusses the
di↵erence in the level of access to health and life insurances between the urban and rural
areas. In order to make an accurate investigation and reliable comparison, this thesis
does not contain any cross-national research. In fact, simply one country is chosen for the
study, namely Colombia in South America. Colombia is classified as an upper middle-
income country (The World Bank, 2015), which is suitable for this thesis since health
insurance is widely adopted both in urban and rural areas. Life insurance is not as widely
adopted as health insurance, but it is on the rise as premium sales are driven by newly
formed life insurance arrangements (Beresford and Rubio, 2015). This is also suitable
for this thesis since it means that our thesis can contribute to the collected knowledge
on how such insurance a↵ects household income. Since the investigation is not a cross-
country study, di↵erences such as political policies, culture or ethnicity, which could
a↵ect household income after a health or death shock, are not taken into consideration.
Our thesis is limited by two inherent problems with insurance systems. First, the
existence of incomplete contracts with a persistent disability to enforce them, and sec-
ond, the prevalence of asymmetric information where the risk seller has an information
advantage compared to the risk buyer (Besley, 1995). In turn, asymmetric informa-
tion takes two forms. There might be some pre-existing characteristics of the individual
which makes him/her more prominent to risk (adverse selection). Once the insurance
is acquired, the individual might change his/her behavior which makes him/her more
prominent to risk (moral hazard). We therefore assume that the risk-taking behavior
caused by the possession of a health or life insurance is equal in the target areas as well,
and consequently this factor is not accounted for in our investigation.
In this thesis we make three assumptions regarding health and death shocks. First,
that a health or death shock is sudden and unexpected. Second, that the fraction of
cases where the health or death shock is in fact expected, is equal in both urban and
rural areas. Third, that the shock is evenly distributed across age as the severity of an
income loss might di↵er due to the age of the individual exposed to the health or death
shock.
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Chapter 2
Theory and background
Some pre-existing knowledge regarding the actual situation in Colombia in terms of
insurance coverage and health care system is needed for essential understanding in this
thesis. In addition, the e↵ect of formal insurances on economic growth is key to fully
grasp the importance of evolving insurance systems in developing countries. This is
covered in this chapter, which also describes previous work that is informative within
this field of study.
2.1 The health care system in Colombia
Colombia is a country with a radical development when it comes to its health care system.
In 1990, only approximately 24% of the population had health insurance, and it was
notably beneficial for the richer part of the population (OECD, 2015). In fact, 47% of the
wealthiest population quintile had health insurance, but only 4.3% of the poorest quintile
had any form of financial protection against physical illness. According to Alvarez et al.
(2011) other problems Colombia faced in the early 1990’s were inadequate distribution
of the health care system in troublesome urban and rural areas, and a population growth
larger than what the health system could cover. These problems resulted in a reformation
of the health law, with the main goal of achieving universal health care (Chapman,
2016). The structural reform was called Law 100, and one of the significant changes
that it entailed was that hospitals and health centers both in urban and rural areas were
privatized, meaning that the public health systems were replaced by individual private
health insurance systems. In addition, a primary plan for medical aid was conducted
to ensure that insurance companies provided insurance holders with certain health care
services (Alvarez et al., 2011).
Over the last 20 years, the reforms have resulted in a positive change for the Colom-
bian health system. Some of the improvements that Colombia has experienced are for
instance shorter waiting times for an appointment and increased health care service
standards (OECD, 2015). An increase in access to health care in the poorest areas in
Colombia has also had major positive e↵ects on, inter alia, the health conditions of the
inhabitants. Today, citizens pay less for health care, and free services have become more
accessible. Furthermore, the e↵ects of the reforms seem to favor those in rural and poor
urban areas the most (Giedion and Uribe, 2009; Trujillo et al., 2005). OECD (2015)
considers the health care system in Colombia to be well designed and states that the
country is making progress towards universal health care. Despite the fact that 76.3% of
the population lived in cities in 2014, the access to health care in Colombia is somewhat
equalized.
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Despite this positive development of the health system, there are several factors that
still need improvement, such as the supply of medical aid and the overall quality of
health care services (Giedion and Uribe, 2009). In addition, there are other problems
to be resolved in Colombia to further optimize the health system. Colombia has over
the last 40 years had an armed ongoing conflict that has resulted in numerous dreadful
actions, such as kidnapping, homicide, sexual violence and multiple injuries, a↵ecting
the access to health care. According to OECD (2015), this conflict has a↵ected rural
areas more than urban areas.
Critics in regard to the health care system, such as Webster (2012), claim that the
Colombian health system might not be as good in practice as it is in theory, and that
in reality, inequalities and long queues still remain in Colombia today. Furthermore,
he states that the health system is beginning to break down, and that the Colombian
government has been accused of taking bribes. Others doubt Law 100, and consider
the e↵ects of the health system unclear, and that the system is still unbalanced and
discriminating against the poor (Giedion and Uribe, 2009).
2.2 Formal insurance in Colombia
The Colombian insurance market is dominated by compulsory insurances, workers’ com-
pensation and life insurance (Beresford and Rubio, 2015). The compulsory insurances
are over 50 in total, and they are frequently expanded by the Colombian legislators.
These compulsory insurances a↵ect di↵erent sectors such as motor liability, employers’
liability and environmental liability, which cover any liability which may arise from neg-
ligence, accidents or environmental damage. Despite this mandatory legislation, evasion
rates are high and for the employers’ liability approximately 62% of the employers are
not covered by an insurance if an employee gets injured at the workplace.
Foreign insurance companies have a strong foothold in the Colombian insurance
market, and in 2014, approximately 58% of the life and non-life insurance market was
dominated by foreign insurers (Beresford and Rubio, 2015). However, by legislation, life
insurance can only be provided from regulated companies within the country. In order for
foreign insurance companies to provide this they must therefore establish branch o ces
within the country and be approved and regulated by the Financial Superintendency.
In 2015, 97% of the Colombian population were covered by some form of formal
health insurance arrangement, compared to the significantly smaller number of approx-
imately 24% in 1990 (OECD, 2015). In 2014 the growth of premium sales by insurance
companies was 8.9% and led by life insurance arrangements, meaning that more and
more Colombians increase their insurance coverage (Beresford and Rubio, 2015).
Beresford and Rubio (2015) state that a major issue for the Colombian insurance
market is to raise their reputation as many Colombians view insurance as a luxury only
available to high income households. They further predict that the market will continue
to benefit from an increased competition due to new market entries which will stimulate
economic growth. This would mean that the insurance market has not yet reached
market equilibrium where there is a balance between insurance supply and demand.
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New company entries can thus still improve the current market as market competition
tend to lower prices, something that seems crucial for changing the current beliefs of
insurances being a luxury.
2.3 E↵ect of formal insurances on economic growth
A key economic theory is that an improvement in health increases an individual’s pro-
ductivity and thus also increases his/her income (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). In turn,
higher productivity leads to higher economic growth. Hence, a well-functioning formal
health insurance system is important for developing countries wishing to increase their
economic growth.
Furthermore, a well-functioning insurance system can be used to reduce income risk,
meaning that a household’s income would be negatively a↵ected by some exogenous
shock. Insurance thus smooths the household’s consumption over time, meaning that if
faced with some hardship a household can still to some degree consume the same amount
as before (Dercon, 2000). This is especially important in the case of life insurances
as a household’s permanent income loss can be somewhat recovered through a formal
insurance plan. Furthermore it is often the poorest households who are left without any
form of insurance, meaning that a negative income shock would to a very large extent
be passed on to the household’s current consumption (Morduch, 1999). Targeting these
households with an improved access to health and life insurance would therefore also
increase their spending possibilities as insurance protects current consumption.
Imperfect insurance markets are also an ine cient use of resources which might yield
a misallocation of resources within a country. This in turn lowers returns and may
lower the overall investment rate as risk aversion tend to lead to ine cient investments
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Improving such insurance markets is thus important for
economic growth as investments might increase.
2.4 Previous work
A former study performed by Wagsta↵ (2007) examines the economic e↵ects of health
shocks in Vietnam. The conclusion of this work shows that with respect to income, urban
households are more vulnerable when exposed to a health shock than rural households.
He also finds that health shocks a↵ect income with a larger negative e↵ect in urban
households in comparison to rural households. The reason for this di↵erentiation between
urban and rural households, Wagsta↵ (2007) argues is due to the fact that rural areas are
better at adjusting labor supply if one family member dies or cannot contribute to the
workforce anymore. He also looks at how health shocks a↵ect medical spending, which
he claims to be largely dependent on whether the household has a formal insurance.
He finds that the medical spending if a household member is hospitalized is larger for
those uninsured than insured. One thing to take into account however, is that formal
insurances can largely influence how household income is a↵ected by health shocks.
Wagsta↵ (2007) describes the health insurance coverage as limited in the study conducted
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in Vietnam 1993-1998. In addition, the health insurance scheme used in the investigation
was introduced 1993, and therefore relatively new when the data was collected. In
contrast, and as mentioned in section 2.2, 97% of the Colombian population had health
insurance in 2015 (OECD, 2015). This thesis will therefore contribute to Wagsta↵’s work
by investigating the income recovery from health and death shocks in urban and rural
areas in Colombia, and then based on these results and insurance statistics, analyze the
e↵ect of health and life insurances.
There is an endogeneity problem when studying the causal e↵ect of health or death
shocks on economic outcomes as health and wealth are often correlated. One way to
avoid this is done by Mohanan (2013) who studies the exogenous health shock of injuries
from bus accidents on a specific route in India. This is then compared to the control
group who travel the same bus route but is unexposed to the shock. He finds that shock-
a↵ected households were able to smooth their consumption in terms of food and housing.
However, households were only able to pay their health-care related bills by borrowing,
meaning that the main e↵ect of the health shock was increased debts. However, one
year after the shock Mohanan (2013) was unable to find any di↵erence between the
treatment and control groups in terms of labor supply, meaning that both groups had
the same on average monthly labor income. Although not measured by Mohanan (2013),
it is reasonable to assume that a death shock might lead to similar household behavior,
meaning that if the bus accident led to someone’s death the household would have to
increase its debt in order to smooth its consumption. Our thesis will contribute to
this study by acknowledging the endogeneity problem that comes with studying health,
and by extending the use of a health insurance. However, as previously mentioned, we
assume that these problems are normalized as we compare the urban and rural areas.
The fact that borrowing is important for households if exposed to a health shock is also
acknowledged, but our thesis will only focus on household income and instead add the
importance of health and life insurances. Further studies could perhaps include a factor
of household debts.
Townsend (1995) does not test variations between urban and rural areas, however, he
shows that there is a significant variation within and between rural villages in Thailand
in the terms of their informal structures. The village closest to Bangkok in the sample
deviates from the others as this village has integrated with the cash economy of the
urban areas. However, despite being in a rural area the village seem to lack any internal
informal insurance arrangements. The non-existence of an informal system can therefore
be explained by the proximity to the urban areas. This proximity thus makes the village
a less close-knit community which in turn makes the enforcement of informal insurance
arrangements more di cult (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). The other villages vary in
terms of the extent of the informal arrangements, but they still display some tendencies
of common risk-sharing arrangements (Townsend, 1995). As stated before, informal
insurance arrangements are not measured in this thesis, however, they are still highly
relevant when analyzing the results. Further studies might also want to replicate the
study made by Townsend (1995) and measure variation withing rural areas, especially
concerning their distance to urban areas.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This chapter covers the practical issues of the empirical study conducted in order to
answer our research question, does the income of urban and rural households recover
di↵erently from an income shock caused by an exogenous health or death shock?. All
decisions and strategic choices throughout the process are accounted for here. The data
is described, such as its origin and the specific variables analyzed, followed by a brief
discussion regarding the limitations the data has. Finally, some summary statistics are
presented, describing the distribution of the observations.
3.1 Approach
In order to test our research question we exclusively used linear OLS regressions, however,
these regressions were divided into two groups with di↵erent approaches and interpreta-
tions. First, we have what we from here on will refer to as a naive OLS regression (see
equation 3.1), to test the individual e↵ect of a health or death shock on households in
urban and rural areas. Then, we used the di↵erence-in-di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DDD)
identification strategy (see equation 3.2) to answer the research question, namely to in-
vestigate the di↵erence in income recovery between urban and rural areas caused by a
health shock or death shock. The dependent variable Y in these equations represents
monthly household income measured in Colombian pesos (COP) throughout this thesis.
Shock and time are dummy variables, the first equal to one if a household has experi-
enced a shock, and the latter equal to one for the later time period (meaning the time
period after the shock). Note that time is hence a dummy and not a continuous variable.
The naive OLS also includes a vector for a set of controls as illustrated by X’.
With the first naive OLS regression we examined the causal e↵ects of a shock on
monthly household income. We performed this regression with two di↵erent shock vari-
ables: health shock and death shock. Furthermore, this regression was run on data
collected from two di↵erent periods of time in order to compare to what degree house-
holds were a↵ected by the shock. In addition, we investigated di↵erences between urban
and rural areas, in both time periods. By running these regressions, we were able to
see how the shock a↵ected the households’ monthly income in the two areas and in two
di↵erent time periods.
The reason we refer to the first linear OLS regression(s) as naive is because of the
assumptions that have to be made in order to apply the OLS regression technique. First,
the errors have to be normally distributed, which we found out, that in this case they were
not. This matter was resolved by taking the logarithm of monthly household income, as
can be seen in all regressions throughout this thesis. Second, as mentioned in section 1.2,
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we have assumed that the shock is exogenous and that there is zero correlation between
the regressors and the error term. This means that poor and rich people with the same
probability experience a health or death shock and there is therefore no correlation
between unobserved variables and monthly household income.
log(Y ) = ↵0 + ↵1Shock +X’  + U (3.1)
Although the naive OLS regression is useful in order to investigate the e↵ect on
monthly household income caused by a shock, it does not illustrate a significant di↵er-
ence in the e↵ect after a shock between urban and rural areas. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that the shock in fact is exogenous, which can cause an endogeneity problem.
In order to avoid the potential endogeneity problem and to provide an answer to our
research question, the DDD identification strategy composes a good method of inves-
tigation. It provides the opportunity to examine how the di↵erent areas are a↵ected
by a shock in relation to each other. Thus, the DDD allowed us to test two regions
(urban/rural), in two time periods (before/after the shock), between those that did and
did not experience a shock. The DDD estimator is displayed in equation 3.2 and the
regression in 3.3. In equation 3.2, the delta represents the treatment e↵ect (the e↵ect of
the shock) and is the main coe cient of interest. t1 and t0 are the two time periods, t0
being a time period before the shock occurred, and t1 being a time period after the shock
has occurred. As with the naive OLS, the DDD includes a vector of controls illustrated
by X’, illustrated in equation 3.3.
 ˆ = [(Y¯t1   Y¯t0)Urban,Shock   (Y¯t1   Y¯t0)Urban,No shock] 
 [(Y¯t1   Y¯t0)Rural,Shock   (Y¯t1   Y¯t0)Rural,No shock]
(3.2)
log(Y ) = ↵0 + ↵1T ime+ ↵2Area+ ↵3Shock + ↵4(T ime ⇤Area)+
+↵5(T ime ⇤ Shock) + ↵6(Area ⇤ Shock) +  (T ime ⇤Area ⇤ Shock) +X’  + U
(3.3)
In order to clarify the e↵ects of including area in the regression, we additionally did a
regression using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) identification strategy which consists of
the same variables and relationships as the DDD, but excludes area (see equations B.1
and B.2 in Appendix B). We thus compared the di↵erence in income recovery between
households that have experienced and not experienced a shock. Correspondingly, a
significant interaction term between time and shock tells us that the e↵ect of a shock
on monthly household income di↵ers depending on time. The results from the DD are
not included in chapter 4 since they do not answer our research question. However, they
will be mentioned briefly in the evaluation of the results in chapter 5, and are therefore
included in Appendix B.
An alternative approach to using the DDD would be to use two DD identification
strategies, one for each area. However, in contrast to the DDD, these would not control
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for area fixed e↵ects. All single variables in the DDD contain observable and unobserv-
able characteristics correlated with household monthly income, controlled for as fixed
e↵ects. This means that we control for variables that are not included in our study but
might still correlate with income. Accordingly, the DDD was considered the best choice.
When using the DD and the DDD identification strategies one needs first to control
for the OLS assumptions and then the parallel time trend assumption. The parallel time
trend assumption states that absent the treatment (shock), both groups (areas) would
exhibit parallel time trends in the dependent variable (monthly household income). This
would give weight to the fact that any conclusions drawn from the study were due to
the shock and not some other time trend which is unaccounted for.
3.2 Data
The data used for our analyses was retrieved from Encuesta Longitudinal Colombiana
(ELCA) conducted by the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota´, Colombia. ELCA is a
survey that was constructed with the aim of establishing a panel database of Colombian
households during twelve years, with new data gathering every three years (Universidad
de los Andes, n.d.). ELCA has previously been used for instance by Ferna´ndez et al.
(2014) to test how the labor market in rural Colombia cope with violent shocks. Iregui-
Boho´rquez et al. (2016) have also used the ELCA survey to test the relationship between
health status and labor participation.
In this thesis we used the two rounds that have been published this far (June 5,
2017), namely 2010 and 2013. Since the data is collected at household level between
two di↵erent areas we have throughout all regressions used clustered standard errors
at household level. This is necessary as some events or shocks might a↵ect groups of
households within one area in the same way. For example, a health shock might a↵ect
multiple households in a rural village if the cause of the shock is an epidemic related to
the cattle which several households tend. Accordingly, we assume independence across
the regions (sick households in rural areas do not a↵ect households in urban areas), but
we allow for some correlation within a region (sick households within rural areas might
a↵ect other households within the rural areas).
3.2.1 Organization of data and variable description
When we received the data it was originally divided into several di↵erent datasets, split
into the categories Households, Shocks and People for each area and year. The original
Spanish names can be found in table A.1 in Appendix A. We combined all datasets into
one, using household id as key. The Households datasets contained data regarding for
instance the number of people in a household, whether a household had a health or life
insurance, etc. The Shocks datasets contained information about what kind of shocks
a household had experienced, a↵ected household members, etc. Finally, the People
datasets contained information about the household head, such as age and sex, which
were used as control variables. Since all data was originally in Spanish, the first step was
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to translate and identify key variables that would be used in the analyses in this thesis.
The key variables can be found in table A.2 in Appendix A, together with the original
Spanish names of the variables. In addition, the shock variables in the Shocks datasets
needed adjustment, and their change of structure can also be seen in table A.2.
Our dependent variable, monthly household income measured in Colombian Pesos
(COP), was a bit troublesome to organize with the given data. As it turned out, the
variable that represented monthly household income from labor (which was of most in-
terest for us), was missing in the dataset called Rural Households 2013. Instead, the
rural questionnaire for 2013 included two new income variables: income from agricul-
tural labor and income from non-agricultural labor. Our first assumption was that the
variable for income from labor from 2010 had been divided into two separate income
variables in 2013. Therefore, we added the income from agricultural labor and income
from non-agricultural labor together in order to get a representative income variable to
compare to 2010. However, we were not sure that this would be a good representation
of the income variable, since the di↵erent structure of the income variables in rural areas
2013 could imply that the distribution of income had been measured di↵erently than in
the other datasets. Apart from income from labor, other income variables were income
from pensions, income from leases, income from interests or dividends and other income.
Therefore, we created a new income variable in which we added all income variables
together in 2010 and 2013 respectively. This allowed us to also use this representation
of the income variable to try and receive comparable results. In the end, we decided to
analyze our results based on the income variable that included all variations of income
as we believe it to be a more credible measure. The reason we believe so is because if the
income variables have been defined di↵erently in 2013 compared to 2010, combining all
income variables reduces the chance of mismatching labor income. However, another way
to reconstruct the household monthly income would be to look at household expenses,
either in comparison to the present income variables or as a standalone dependent vari-
able. Due to time constraint this was not possible for our study, but could for future
research be an interesting approach.
Health shock is in the datasets defined as ”accident or illness of a household member
that prevented him/her from performing his/her daily activities”, and death shock as the
”death of the head of household or the head’s spouse”. There was an additional death
shock variable in the ELCA datasets that could have potentially been used (death of
other household member(s)), but we decided that the death of the household head or
the head’s spouse would be the most destabilizing shock for the household and thus give
a greater e↵ect on the loss of income.
However, the formulation of the shock question in the survey di↵ers between the
2010 and 2013 round. In 2010 the ELCA survey asked whether the household had
experienced any of these shocks within the last twelve months. In 2013 households were
asked whether they had experienced any of the shocks between 2010 and 2013. The fact
that the time frame di↵ers between the rounds must therefore be taken into account
when evaluating the e↵ect of the shocks.
Furthermore, the ELCA survey was designed to exclude single-households and to not
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register a household member over 65 years old as the household head. The reason for
not registering older household heads was due to the fact that they are nearing the end
of their work cycle and might not yield interesting income results in twelve years time
(Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Economico - CEDE, 2016). This means that all
households that have experienced a death shock where a household head has died, has
lost a household head younger than 65 years old.
Regarding the insurance variables, the health insurance variable was missing in the
datasets from 2010. Accordingly, we had to assume that if a household had a health
insurance in 2013, they also had one in 2010. For our analyses we handled the life
insurance variable in the same way as the health insurance variable.
The urban areas were defined as the following regions: Atla´ntica, Oriental, Central,
Pac´ıfica and Bogota´, and the rural areas were defined as: Atla´ntica Media, Cundi-
Boyacense, Eje Cafetero, and Centro-Oriente. In both areas these regions were in turn
divided into subareas to ensure a proper distribution of observations (Centro de Estudios
Sobre Desarrollo Economico - CEDE, 2010).
Additionally, our regressions included several control variables, namely sex of house-
hold head, age of household head, number of people in the household, and whether the
household had a health or death shock in the twelve months before 2010. Whether
the head is male or female is of interest because targeting female headed households in
poverty reliving e↵orts might yield better results than targeting male headed households
(Morrison et al., 2007). For us this would mean that perhaps a health or death shock
would a↵ect a household’s income di↵erently depending on the sex of the household
head. The age of the head might a↵ect household income because an individual is only
expected to provide income to the household during certain years of his/her life. Once
an individual enters the labor market, income tends to increase with working experience,
which an older person would have more of than a younger one. The number of people in
the household might a↵ect household income as more people can contribute to (if they
are old enough), but are also dependent on, the collective income. The final control
variable regards whether the household had experienced a health or death shock in the
last twelve months before 2010. The idea is hence that if a household has already expe-
rienced a shock, it can already be disadvantaged compared to non-shock households. All
regressions in this thesis were run first without control variables, and then with these
four controls. However, when running the naive OLS for 2010 it does not make sense to
add a control variable for those who had a shock in 2010, since that variable is already
included as an independent variable. Thus, only three control variables (sex, age and
the number of people in the household) where used for this specific regression.
In general, some overall adjustments had to be made to the observed households in the
datasets. First, there were duplicates of household identification numbers in the datasets
containing observations from 2013. This was due to divisions of households where one (or
more) members of the household moved and consequently formed their own household.
This statistical issue was dealt with by simply removing all split households from the
datasets. The number of split households were relatively few (118 households) compared
to the fraction of households that had remained the same. Therefore, we concluded that
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removing split households from the datasets would not a↵ect the outcome of our results.
Another factor to account for was that some households moved between the target
areas between 2010 and 2013. To be able to conduct a fair analysis where the two areas
are compared, this thesis only considers households that remain in their urban or rural
areas in both years. Households that have moved between areas were therefore removed
from the datasets.
As with all panel data surveys there is a possibility of households not wishing to
complete all rounds, and a possibility of adding new households in later rounds that were
not the original subjects of the survey. In this study these households were consequently
also removed.
3.2.2 Limitations with the data
In our monthly income variable, we chose not to include income from money aid. The
main reason for this is that income from money aid is a bit unstructured in the ELCA
datasets, and we were not able to track why households received money aid, or by whom
the aid was provided. Furthermore, this variable did not exist in the Households dataset
for rural areas in 2010, which left us without the possibility to compare the income from
money aid between 2010 and 2013. We were thus unable to test whether households
that had experienced a shock received extra money aid between 2010 and 2013 or not.
Another variable which we might have wanted to include in our data is the collection
from insurance policies over the last twelve months. The main reason why we did not
include collections from insurance policies was that the number of observations were
extremely few (27 in total for both years and areas combined).
As previously mentioned, only formal insurance data has been collected in the ELCA
survey. The extent to which the households might have informal insurance arrangements
will in this thesis therefore be evaluated based on the regression results and the statis-
tical information regarding the level of formal insurance arrangements. Further studies
might try to collect information about the informal insurances in order to fully explain
the relationship between formal and informal insurance in certain areas. However, as
mentioned in chapter 1, informal insurance is hard to capture.
In section 3.1 we mention the parallel time trend assumption as an important assump-
tion for the DD and DDD identification strategies. One way to argue that the parallel
assumption is fulfilled is to compare the two groups (urban/rural areas) in earlier time
periods and observe no significant di↵erences in their time trends. Any di↵erences in the
next period would thus be due to the treatment. For this thesis, however, no such data
was available as we have used the first and the second round of the ELCA survey. This
might therefore a↵ect our conclusions as there is a possibility that other time-trending
factors have been obtained and measured in the model.
3.2.3 Summary statistics
The sample size was, after the removal of missing cases and inconsistencies, 16,532 ob-
servations for both years combined. Since households that had moved between areas, or
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that did not participate in the survey both years, were removed, we had 8,266 house-
holds that completed the survey questions of interest in both 2010 and 2013. The overall
statistics can be seen in table 3.1. There might be some power issues as this can be con-
sidered quite a small sample to be representative of the whole Colombian population.
However, we are confident that the sample to some extent can reflect the population and
that our analyses therefore are valid. Of course, generalizations must be made with care
in regards to this sample size.
When looking at each area separately in table 3.1 we have the same number of
households in for example the urban areas in 2013 as in 2010 due to the elimination of
household inconsistencies. The sample size of the urban areas was thus for each year
4,373 observations (52.90%), and for the rural areas 3,893 observations (47.10%). That
is, our sample was almost evenly divided between the urban and rural areas. In 2013,
3,967 households in total replied to the question regarding health or life insurance. Only
353 (8.90%) of the households replied that they had a health insurance, and 849 (21.40%)
households claimed they had a life insurance.
As illustrated in table 3.1, 3,157 (38.19%) out of 8,266 households said they had
experienced a health shock between 2010 and 2013. In the 2010 round, 1,307 (15.81%)
out of 8,266 households replied that they had experienced a health shock within the
twelve months of the survey in 2010. For the death shock between 2010 and 2013, 182
(2.20%) households had experienced a death shock where their household head or the
head’s spouse had died. In the twelve months before 2010, 36 (0.44%) out of 8,266
households had the same death shock. The remaining control variables contain the 2010
values, 6,002 (72.61%) out of 8,266 households had a male household head, the head’s
average age was approximately 44.6 years old, and the households consisted on average
of 4.4 people.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Urban 0.5290 0.499 8266
Health insurance 0.0890 0.285 3967
Life insurance 0.2140 0.41 3967
Health shock 2013 0.3819 0.486 8266
Health shock 2010 0.1581 0.365 8266
Death shock 2013 0.0220 0.147 8266
Death shock 2010 0.0044 0.066 8266
Male 0.7261 0.446 8266
Age 44.567 12.122 8266
Household size 4.3687 2.003 8266
When sorting this by area, the summary statistics can be found in table 3.2 for
the urban areas. 171 (6.87%) out of the 2,489 urban households that answered the
insurance question had health insurance, and 678 (27.24%) households had life insurance.
Furthermore, 1,648 (37.69%) out of 4,373 households in total had experienced a health
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shock between 2010 and 2013. On the contrary, 670 (15.32%) of the households had
experienced a health shock in the twelve months before the survey in 2010. Between
2010 and 2013, 88 (2.01%) households had experienced a death shock, and in the twelve
months before 2010 this number was 17 (0.39%) of the households. The remaining
control variables in 2010 had the following values, 2,814 (64.35%) of the households had
a male household head, the average age of the household head was 43.5 years old, and a
household consisted on average of 4.2 people.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics in urban areas
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Health insurance 0.0687 0.253 2489
Life insurance 0.2724 0.445 2489
Health shock 2013 0.3769 0.485 4373
Health shock 2010 0.1532 0.36 4373
Death shock 2013 0.0201 0.14 4373
Death shock 2010 0.0039 0.062 4373
Male 0.6435 0.479 4373
Age 43.517 11.968 4373
Household size 4.2045 1.995 4373
For the rural areas the summary statistics are illustrated in table 3.3, and as can
be seen, 182 (12.31%) out of 1,478 rural households had health insurance, and 171
(11.57%) households had life insurance. Between 2010 and 2013, 1,509 (38.76%) out of
3,893 households had experienced a health shock, and in the twelve months before 2010,
this number was 637 (16.36%) of the households. For the death shock between 2010
and 2013, 94 (2.41%) had experienced the death of their household head or the head’s
spouse. In the twelve months before 2010, 19 (0.49%) of the households had experienced
the death shock. The remaining control variables for 2010 have the following values,
3,188 (81.89%) households had a male household head, the average age of the household
head was 45.7 years old, and the household consisted on average of 4.5 people.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics in rural areas
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Health insurance 0.1231 0.329 1478
Life insurance 0.1157 0.32 1478
Health shock 2013 0.3876 0.487 3893
Health shock 2010 0.1636 0.37 3893
Death shock 2013 0.0241 0.154 3893
Death shock 2010 0.0049 0.07 3893
Male 0.8189 0.385 3893
Age 45.747 12.187 3893
Household size 4.5430 2.002 3893
As seen by these summary statistics, in the rural areas the ratio of households that
had health insurance is approximately the same as the ratio that had life insurance.
However, for the urban areas almost four times as many households had life insurance
compared to health insurance. We can also see that approximately the same percentage
of households in either area had experienced a health or death shock in both the twelve
months before 2010 and in between 2010 and 2013.
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter is structured so that we first present the results from our naive OLS re-
gressions divided by year, shock and area. Then, the chapter ends with the results and
interpretations of the regressions using the DDD identification strategy.
4.1 Naive OLS regressions
Table 4.1 illustrates the results from the naive OLS regressions for 2013, and table
4.2 illustrates the same regressions but run on data from 2010. As displayed, twelve
regressions were run in total for each year, and will hereby be referred to as models 1 to
12.
The regressions contain the e↵ect of a shock on monthly household income and can
be divided into three di↵erent groups: general, urban and rural. General includes all
households in both areas, while urban contains specifically the urban households and
rural specifically the rural households. For each group, the regression were run two
times: one without control variables and one with. In the first six models the shock is
categorized as a health shock, and in the final six as a death shock.
A result described as significant in this section is significant at the 10% level, the 5%
level or the 1% level. For further information of what level of significance that occur in
each case, see tables 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1.1 Results from 2013
As seen in table 4.1, when investigating the e↵ects of a health shock on monthly house-
hold income in the di↵erent areas we get the following results. Models 1 to 4 are all
significant. For the first model this means that if a household has had a health shock be-
tween 2010 and 2013, the income level is negatively a↵ected by 11.0% compared to those
that did not experience a health shock within these years. This general case thus applies
to households in both urban and rural areas, and the significance holds when adding the
controls in model 2, increasing the negative e↵ect to 12.3%. The interpretation of model
3 is that if a household in the urban areas has had a health shock between 2010 and
2013, the income level is negatively a↵ected by 17.4% compared to those in the urban
areas that did not experience a health shock within these years. This significance and
interpretation holds when adding controls in model 4, and changes the negative e↵ect
to 24.2%. As models 5 and 6 are not significant for the health shock variable we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that in the rural areas there is no di↵erence in income between
those who did have a health shock and those who did not.
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For the control variables in models 2, 4 and 6 we can see that being male has a positive
income e↵ect and is consistently significant in all three models. Age is significant both
the general case (model 2) and the rural case (model 6), and has in both cases a negative
e↵ect on income with approximately 1%. Household size is consistently significant with
a positive coe cient, whereas having a shock in the twelve months before 2010 is not
significant in either one of the models.
For the death shock, on the other hand, all models except model 12 are significant.
The interpretation of model 7 is that if a household (regardless of area) has had a death
shock between 2010 and 2013, the household’s monthly income is negatively a↵ected by
91.7% compared to those that did not experience a death shock between these years.
Adding control variables does not a↵ect the significance level but slightly reduces the
negative e↵ect on monthly income to 83.5%. The interpretation of model 9 is that if a
household in the urban areas has had a death shock between 2010 and 2013, the income
level is negatively a↵ected by 112.4% compared to those that did not experience a death
shock in the urban areas between these years. Adding the control variables to this in
model 10, the significance of death shock decreases and the negative e↵ect on household
income changes to 100.1%. For model 11, the results indicate that if a household in the
rural areas has had a death shock between 2010 and 2013, the income level is negatively
a↵ected by 61.4% compared to those that did not experience a death shock within these
years. This significance for the death shock is however lost when adding control variables
in model 12.
For the control variables in models 8, 10 and 12, again being male is consistently
significant with a positive e↵ect on a household’s monthly income. Furthermore, age
is again significant with a negative coe cient in both the general case (model 8) and
in the rural case (model 12) but not in the urban one (model 10). Household size has
also consistent significance in all cases with a positive e↵ect on the household’s income.
Lastly, whether or not the household had a death shock in the twelve months before
2010 is only significant in the rural model with controls (model 12) and has a positive
income e↵ect. The interpretation is thus that households who have had a previous death
shock in 2010 in the rural areas have had a positive income e↵ect with 115.7% compared
to those who did not experience the death shock.
4.1.2 Results from 2010
When it comes to 2010, we have the following results in table 4.2. Models 1, 2, 5 and
6 are significant, while models 3 and 4 are not. Regarding the control variables, the
interpretation is the same as in 2013, but now age is significant in all models. In model
1, regardless of area, if a household has experienced a health shock in the twelve months
before 2010, the income level is negatively a↵ected by 32.9% compared to those that did
not experience a health shock in the same time period. When adding control variables
to this in model 2 all controls are significant and the coe cient for the health shock
has changed to 31.5%. Furthermore, models 5 and 6 imply that if a household in the
rural areas has had a health shock before 2010, the income level is negatively a↵ected by
49.1% and 46.9% respectively, compared to those that did not experience a health shock
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in rural areas in the same time period. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that in the urban areas there is no di↵erence in monthly household income before and
after a health shock if it occurred in the twelve months before 2010. The control variables
in model 4 are all significant and have positive coe cients.
The e↵ect of a death shock on monthly household income in 2010 is remarkably
di↵erent from the rest of the results. All models except model 9 and 10 are significant
for the death shock variable, however with positive coe cients. The interpretation for
model 7 is that if a household (regardless of area) has had a death shock before 2010, the
income level is positively a↵ected by 85.1% compared to those that did not experience
a death shock before 2010. All controls added to this in model 8 are significant and
the e↵ect of the death shock on the monthly income has increased to 94.2%. For rural
areas in model 11 the results imply that if a household has had a death shock in the
twelve months before 2010, the income level is positively a↵ected by 166.4% compared to
those in the rural areas that did not experience a death shock. Again, when adding the
controls in model 12 all control variables are significant and have increased the coe cient
for the death shock now to a positive income e↵ect of 220.4%. However, for urban areas
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no di↵erence in monthly household
income before and after a death shock has occurred, if the shock occurred in the twelve
months before 2010.
4.1.3 Summary of results from the naive OLS regressions
First of all we can see some similarities between the two regressions. The e↵ect of a
health shock for the general case is significant both with and without controls in both
2010 and 2013. In both cases the coe cient is negative and a health shock thus seems to
overall have a negative e↵ect on monthly household income. This negative impact seems
to be greater in the 2010 round as this coe cient is larger and more significant. However,
we also see some variations for the health shock between the regressions. For 2013 the
urban models are significant, but in 2010 we have significance for the rural models. For
2013 the e↵ect of a health shock is thus negative in urban areas, but nothing can be said
about the e↵ect in rural areas. In 2010, on the contrary, the e↵ect of a health shock is
negative in rural areas, but nothing can be said about the e↵ect in urban areas.
For the death shock in 2013 we see a clear negative e↵ect on monthly income, re-
gardless of area. However, for 2010 the e↵ect of a death shock is very much positive in
both the general case and in the rural case, however nothing can be said about the e↵ect
in urban areas. The positive e↵ect on household income after a death shock is not very
plausible and seems to contradict the interpretation of the other results.
Overall it seems that these naive OLS models, regardless of area and shock in either
of the years, have very little explanatory power of household monthly income, as seen
by the low R2. However, as previously mentioned in section 3.1, the results from these
naive OLS regressions could be biased as there is a possibility that the assumption of an
exogenous shock is not fulfilled.
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4.2 DDD regressions
Table 4.3 shows the results from the DDD. As illustrated, we only had to run four
models. Model 1 uses health shock on monthly household income, as does model 2 but
adds control variables. Model 3 is thus death shock on monthly household income, with
model 4 adding the controls.
As we can see in table 4.3, the treatment e↵ect (the triple interaction coe cient)
for the health shock is significant on the 10% level and yields a negative e↵ect on the
households monthly income in both model 1 and 2. Without control variables, the
negative treatment e↵ect is 33.4%, and with controls it is 32.5%. Having a health shock
in the twelve months before 2010 gives a 12.2% negative income e↵ect compared to
those that did not have a shock. The interpretation of the above is that urban areas
have a larger di↵erence in monthly household income between those who did and did not
experience a health shock, before and after the shock occurred, compared to the rural
areas. That is, urban areas recover less than rural areas from a health shock occurring
between 2010 and 2013, meaning that households with a health shock in the urban areas
are worse o↵ financially than those in the rural areas.
As mentioned in section 3.1 the single variables contain observable and unobservable
characteristics, controlled for as fixed e↵ects. The results in table 4.3 therefore tell us
that people in Colombia earn more money in 2013 compared to 2010, as can be seen
by the positive and significant coe cients for the time variable. Furthermore, urban
households earn consistently about 257-272% more than rural households, which is also
significant on the 1% level. The single variable for a health shock between 2010 and
2013 is negative and significant at the 10% level without controls, which is interpreted
as poor households being more likely to have a health shock than rich households.
In table 4.3, we also observe that the treatment e↵ect of a death shock is significant
at the 10% level. In fact, the p-value for the treatment e↵ect is 0.05, which means that
it is very close to being significant at the 5% level. The negative e↵ect is 163.3% without
control variables and 160.6% with controls. All variables in models 3 and 4 are significant
on at least the 10% level, except for the interaction of time and death shock, and the
control variable for death shock in 2010. The interpretation of the treatment e↵ect of a
death shock is the same as the one for a health shock. We see that urban areas do not
recover as well as rural areas from a death shock, and that those who had a death shock
in the urban areas in between 2010 and 2013, are worse o↵ financially than those who
had the shock in the rural areas.
As with the health shock, the single variables for the death shock control for fixed
e↵ects. We can therefore see that Colombian households have a higher income in 2013
compared to 2010. We also see that urban households earn 259-274% more than rural
households. Furthermore, the single variable containing death shock in between 2010
and 2013 is significant at the 1% level and negative, which means that poor households
are more likely to have a death shock than rich households.
In table 4.3 we see a quite high degree of explanatory power. Adding the controls
improves these models as the R2 increases to 16.7% and 16.9% for each shock respectively.
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Table 4.3: DDD table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Income Income Income
Year 2013 1.347*** 1.358*** 1.405*** 1.410***
(15.84) (15.98) (19.08) (19.18)
Urban 2.569*** 2.722*** 2.591*** 2.737***
(32.21) (33.63) (37.36) (38.63)
Health shock 2013 -0.278* -0.237
(-1.78) (-1.54)
Year 2013*Urban -1.316*** -1.319*** -1.382*** -1.382***
(-14.51) (-14.58) (-17.60) (-17.66)
Year 2013*Health shock 2013 0.262 0.252
(1.56) (1.50)
Urban*Health shock 2013 0.180 0.135
(1.13) (0.86)
Year 2013*Urban*Health shock 2013 -0.334* -0.325*
(-1.85) (-1.81)
Health shock 2010 -0.122*
(-1.93)
Household size 0.129*** 0.128***
(11.63) (11.50)
Age -0.00694*** -0.00616***
(-3.57) (-3.17)
Male 0.696*** 0.700***
(12.90) (12.96)
Death shock 2013 -1.712*** -1.616***
(-2.77) (-2.66)
Year 2013*Death shock 2013 0.884 0.953
(1.25) (1.35)
Urban*Death shock 2013 1.433** 1.365**
(2.23) (2.16)
Year 2013*Urban*Death shock 2013 -1.633* -1.606*
(-1.96) (-1.92)
Death shock 2010 0.487
(1.60)
Constant 11.07*** 10.24*** 11.03*** 10.15***
(141.88) (76.36) (162.30) (78.91)
N 16170 16170 16170 16170
R2 0.1460 0.1674 0.1480 0.1688
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 5
Discussion
This chapter analyzes the results in chapter 4. We return to the research question and
hypothesis, evaluate our work and assumptions and discuss future work.
5.1 Evaluation of results
Our research question in this thesis was does the income of urban and rural households
recover di↵erently from an income shock caused by an exogenous health or death shock?.
Our results show a statistically significant di↵erence for the treatment e↵ect between
time, residential area, and those a↵ected and una↵ected by a shock. This is consistent
for both the health and death shock. The interpretation of our results is that households
in urban areas that have experienced a shock are worse o↵ financially than those expe-
riencing the shock in rural areas. Thus, our research question is a rmatively justified,
and there seems to be a statistically significant di↵erence in income recovery between
the two areas in Colombia after a health or death shock.
Another way in which our results give evidence to suggest that area is important for
the relationship for income recovery between shock and time is by comparing the results
from the DD regression in Appendix B with the DDD regression in section 4.2. The DD
tests only shock and time with non-significant results, whereas the DDD adds area to
this relationship and yields statistically significant results. It thus seems that whether
the household is urban or rural is very important when testing the e↵ects of health or
death shock on monthly household income.
Our results from the DDD regression in section 4.2 further show that poor households
are more likely to have a larger negative income e↵ect from a health or death shock.
Combining this result with the criticism of Giedion and Uribe (2009) regarding the
Colombian health care system, mentioned in section 2.1, we see that poor households
are more a↵ected by the shock, but are also discriminated by the health system. This
combination thus shows the disadvantage of being poor in Colombia, that you are more
a↵ected by shocks but are less treated by the system.
Furthermore, our naive OLS regressions overall showed that the e↵ects from either
a health or death shock had a negative impact on monthly household income. This
is hence in line with the results from the DDD. However, for the death shock in the
2010 regressions we got positive and statistically significant coe cients. In other words,
the results indicate that experiencing a shock where the household head or the head’s
spouse died within twelve months of the survey in 2010, would have a positive e↵ect on
monthly household income. These results seem unreasonable, not only compared to the
results from 2013, but also from an empirical perspective. Again, this is likely due to
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the naive nature of the OLS which is why we progressed to the DDD. It is likely that
the estimators might be biased as the OLS assumption of an exogenous shock might not
be fulfilled. This is confirmed by previous studies such as Mohanan (2013) which have
showed that there is a consistent endogeneity problem between health and wealth, which
is mentioned in section 2.4. The fact that our results show that poor households are
more a↵ected by the shock indicates that this endogeneity problem is also apparent in
this study. However, we tried to investigate if households that had experienced a death
shock had received a lump sum from some insurance company, which could explain a
temporary positive e↵ect on monthly income, but found no information supporting this
belief in the ELCA datasets. We thus conclude that the results from the naive OLS
might not be reliable for further analysis.
An interesting feature of the ELCA data is that relatively few households in both
urban and rural areas say that they have a health or life insurance. Our results further
show that in the urban areas more households had life insurance than health insurance.
This is very much in contrast to what OECD (2015) states, mentioned in section 2.1,
namely that 97% of the Colombian population had a health insurance in 2015. Even
though our insurance data is from 2013 it is unlikely that such a big increase in insurance
coverage can happen up to 2015. This di↵erence can thus be due to a faulty variable,
meaning that households did not know that they were covered by a health insurance.
It might also be that the households thought the survey question meant some private,
additional health insurance and chose not to include this o cial health insurance in their
reply. A third option is that the o cial numbers are not representative of the actual
situation in Colombia.
5.2 Evaluation of hypothesis
Our hypothesis as to why there might be a di↵erence in income recovery after a shock
between the urban and rural areas was in short that there would be a di↵erence in the
level of and access to insurances between the areas. We considered it likely that formal
insurances were stronger in urban areas and informal insurances were stronger in rural
areas. Our idea was therefore that those a↵ected by a shock and formally uninsured in
urban areas would be financially worse o↵ than those a↵ected by a shock and formally
uninsured in the rural areas. This di↵erence in gap would thus be due to a greater
informal insurance sector in the rural areas than the urban areas.
Our study was unable to test the prevalence of informal insurance in the two areas
due to the nature of our data. We also had to first establish that there in fact was
a di↵erence in income recovery between the areas before we could test insurance as a
mechanism. This is therefore not explicitly considered in this study, however, our results
show that the shock-a↵ected households in urban areas are financially worse o↵ than
those in rural areas. When comparing this to the summary statistics of those who were
and were not formally insured between the areas we can see that urban areas tend to have
a higher ratio of households with life insurance compared to the rural areas. However,
although this ratio is quite high, the life insurance in the urban areas does not seem to
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compensate the loss of the informal insurance system as those a↵ected by a shock are
more negatively a↵ected in the urban areas than the rural areas.
There might be other factors that caused urban households to have a larger gap
in income recovery between those formally insured and uninsured compared to rural
households. As mentioned in section 2.4, Wagsta↵ (2007) states that rural areas are
better at adjusting the labor supply after a death shock. This is in line with our results,
which thus show that urban households are worse at adjusting their labor after a shock
compared to rural households. It is likely that urban areas have a higher degree of wage
jobs with higher specialization skills compared to rural areas, where one farm worker
is more easily substituted for another. As our results are in agreement with previous
studies we deem them to be reliable. Our contribution to this is therefore that we have
confirmed earlier theories and added the importance of insurance.
The overall contribution of our thesis is thus to confirm that there is a di↵erence in
income recovery between urban and rural areas before and after a health or death shock
occurred. We deduct that this di↵erence is likely to be due to di↵erences in informal
insurances. With regards to our sample size it is possible that this di↵erence can be seen
in all urban and rural areas in Colombia. However, one must note that it is likely that
the variation in distance between urban and rural areas might a↵ect the structure of the
formal and informal insurance systems, see the work of Townsend (1995) in section 2.4.
5.3 Future work
As discussed in subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 our income variables were a bit problematic.
Future work might thus want to recreate our study but with household expenditures as
the dependent variable as this might be more reliable and consistently measured between
the rounds of the survey.
The ELCA datasets had plenty of interesting variables that we due to the time
constraint could not investigate further. However, future studies could look at di↵erent
outcome variables such as health status to see for instance whether a health shock a↵ects
health status di↵erently between the areas. Another interesting variable to include would
be households debts, as previous studies showed that after a health shock consumption
can be smoothed using increased debts, see Mohanan (2013) in section 2.4. Whether or
not the level of indebtedness due to a shock di↵ers between the areas could therefore
also yield interesting insights.
Finally, our study is heavily based on the assumptions made in section 1.2, namely
that the health and death shocks are exogenous. Furthermore, in cases where this first
assumption was not fulfilled, the ratio of ”expected shocks”would be equal in both areas.
If these assumptions do not hold, our results from the OLS regressions may not be valid.
However, by using a regression with a DDD identification strategy we have captured
some of the e↵ects that may be caused by a not fully exogenous shock. If it is deemed
that the assumptions indeed do not hold, future work can progress to an IV regression
which uses another variable as an instrument for the shock.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The main conclusion we draw in this thesis is that the income of urban and rural house-
holds recover di↵erently from an income shock caused by a health or death shock.
We further deduct that this might be due to di↵erences in formal and informal
insurances, however further studies on the subject are required. Our results show that
even though life insurance in urban areas are quite common, they seem to work poorly.
This as the households a↵ected by a shock in the urban areas are worse o↵ financially
compared to those a↵ected by the shock in the rural areas.
Our results also confirm previous problems between health and wealth, that poorer
households in fact are more negatively a↵ected by the shock than wealthier households.
Previous studies also indicate that these poorer households are disadvantaged in terms of
the health care system in Colombia. This would mean that poor households in Colombia
are more likely to be a↵ected by a shock but also less likely to receive any medical health
care if needed.
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Appendix A
Variables
Since the datasets are originally in Spanish, this appendix contains both the original
Spanish names of the variables and datasets, together with the English names they are
given in this thesis and a short explanation of what they contain and represent.
Table A.1: Datasets used in this thesis
Original Spanish
name
Given English name Content
Rhogar 2010 Rural Households 2010 All household variables except shock
variables and household head con-
trol variables.
Rchoques hogar 2010 Rural Shocks 2010 Shock variables for households
(health shock and death shock).
Rpersonas 2010 Rural People 2010 Control variables for household head
(sex and age).
Uhogar 2010 Urban Households 2010 All household variables except shock
variables and household head con-
trol variables.
Uchoques hogar 2010 Urban Shocks 2010 Shock variables for households
(health shock and death shock).
Upersonas 2010 Urban People 2010 Control variables for household head
(sex and age).
Rhogar 2013 Rural Households 2013 All household variables except shock
variables and household head con-
trol variables.
Rchoques 2013 Rural Shocks 2013 Shock variables for households
(health shock and death shock).
Uhogar 2013 Urban Households 2013 All household variables except shock
variables and household head con-
trol variables.
Uchoques 2013 Urban Shocks 2013 Shock variables for households
(health shock and death shock).
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Table A.2: Key variables used in this thesis
Original Spanish
name
Given English name Description of variable
consecutivo Household id Identification number of household.
llave Key Another identification number used
mainly for identification of split
households in datasets from 2013.
zona Urban Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
household lives in the urban areas
and 0 in the rural areas.
t personas Household size Number of people in the household.
sexo Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
household head in 2010 was male.
edad Age Age of household head in 2010.
act segsal Health insurance If a household had health insurance
or not in 2013.
act segvida Life insurance If a household had life insurance or
not in 2013.
ing trabajo Average monthly income from labor
per household. Non-existent in the
Rural Households 2013 dataset.
ing trabnoagr Income from non-agricultural labor.
Only existent in the Rural House-
holds 2013 dataset.
ing trabagr Income from agricultural labor.
Only existent in the Rural House-
holds 2013 dataset.
ing pensiones Income from pensions.
ing arriendos Income from leases.
ing intereses div Income from interests or dividends.
ing otros nrem Other income.
Monthly household in-
come
New income variable, non-existent
in original Spanish datasets. Com-
bines ing trabajo, ing trabnoagr,
ing trabagr, ing pensiones,
ing arriendos, ing intereses div
and ing otros nrem. Main vari-
able of interest, used as Y in all
regressions.
Year 2013 New dummy variable equal to 1 if
the data was collected in 2013, and
0 if the data was collected in 2010.
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tuvo choque Combined with choque
to create health shock
2013, health shock 2010,
death shock 2013 and
death shock 2010
Whether the household had experi-
enced the shock or not.
choque Combined with
tuvo choque to cre-
ate health shock 2013,
health shock 2010,
death shock 2013 and
death shock 2010
The di↵erent types of shocks the
household might have had.
Health shock 2013 New variable, non-existent in origi-
nal Spanish datasets. Indicates if a
household had experienced a health
shock or not.
Death shock 2013 New variable, non-existent in origi-
nal Spanish datasets. Indicates if a
household head or the head’s spouse
died during the time period.
Health shock 2010 Indicates if a household has had a
health shock before 2010 or not.
Death shock 2010 Indicates if a household has had a
death shock before 2010 or not.
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Appendix B
Results from DD regressions
The regressions using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DD) identification strategy were made
to illustrate the di↵erence in income between those who were a↵ected and una↵ected
by the shock, before and after the shock occurred. This is thus expressed in equations
B.1 and B.2 which compared to the other regressions in our study do not take area into
account. Again X’ represents a vector of controls.
 ˆ = (Y¯t1   Y¯t0)Shock   (Y¯t1   Y¯t0)No shock (B.1)
log(Y ) = ↵0 + ↵1T ime+ ↵2Shock +  (T ime ⇤ Shock) +X’  + U (B.2)
The regressions were run in four models, the first two for a health shock with and
without controls, and the last two for a death shock with and without controls. In table
B.1 we see that the treatment e↵ect between year and health shock is not statistically
significant, regardless of the inclusion of control variables. This means that the DD
does not tell us much as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no di↵erence
between a↵ected and una↵ected households, before and after the shock occurred. This
conclusion can also be drawn for the treatment e↵ect with death shock as this is not
significant at any of the three significance levels either with or without controls. Since
these results therefore do not contribute to the overall results in this thesis, they are
placed here in the appendix. However, they are briefly mentioned in 5.1.
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Table B.1: DD table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income Income Income Income
Year 2013 0.706*** 0.712*** 0.728*** 0.733***
(15.50) (15.69) (18.48) (18.64)
Health shock 2013 -0.184** -0.158*
(-2.16) (-1.86)
Year 2013*Health shock 2013 0.0907 0.0871
(1.00) (0.96)
Health shock 2010 -0.163**
(-2.28)
Household size 0.0923*** 0.0911***
(7.99) (7.88)
Age -0.0146*** -0.0139***
(-6.68) (-6.33)
Male 0.268*** 0.270***
(4.54) (4.57)
Death shock 2013 -1.145*** -1.014***
(-3.03) (-2.71)
Year 2013*Death shock 2013 0.167 0.228
(0.38) (0.51)
Death shock 2010 0.190
(0.67)
Constant 12.37*** 12.45*** 12.34*** 12.36***
(288.62) (105.89) (332.01) (106.55)
N 16170 16170 16170 16170
R2 0.0173 0.0278 0.0193 0.0288
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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